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I.

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the abiding tension between
surveillance and privacy has been laid bare. Public health epidemiology
has long utilized a variety of surveillance methods-such as contact
tracing, quarantines, and mandatory reporting laws-to control the
spread of disease during past epidemics and pandemics. Officials have
typically justified the resulting intrusions on privacy as necessary for
the greater public good by helping to stave off a larger health crisis. The
nature and scope of public health surveillance in the battle against
COVID-19, however, has significantly changed with the advent of new
technologies. Digital surveillance tools, often embedded in wearable
technology, have greatly increased the ability of governments and
private corporations to monitor large sections of society while
collecting massive amounts of personally identifiable data from millions
of persons around the world-often with little to no regulatory
oversight (or legal limits) on how that information may be later used.
Surveillance responses to public health crises have also historically
disproportionately targeted racialized communities, leading to a
normalization of both racial discrimination and inequality.
The world certainly must use all means to end the devastating
COVID-19 pandemic. We also need to be careful, however, to not
undermine individual privacy rights or engage in racialized responses
to the current crisis. This Essay examines the discord between public
health surveillance and privacy rights and argues that the bio-

* Associate Dean of Research and Scholarship and Professor of Law, Albany Law
School. The author is thankful to the student editors of the Seton Hall University Law
Review for the opportunity to present this work during their annual Symposium.
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surveillance technologies being used to respond to the COVID-19
pandemic-such as contact tracing apps, GPS ankle monitors and other
wearables, the collection of cell phone location data, genomic testing,
and targeted quarantines-can potentially exacerbate discrimination
against racial minorities and immigrants. The Essay concludes with
legal and policy solutions on how to utilize public health surveillance
tools to prevent the spread of COVID-19 while guarding against privacy
violations and racial bias.

II. THE RACIALIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH CRISES
Crises have a way of bringing out the worst in people. Crises, in
particular, can facilitate the expression of racial bias against vulnerable
populations as part of a broader psychological process to make sense of
a suddenly chaotic and upended world.' Reactions to crisis events can
lead people to avoid information that conflicts with their worldview, 2
engage in ideological defensiveness, 3 and fall prey to biased information
processing.4 And so it has been with the COVID-19 pandemic, as racial
disparities in health outcomes have increased while immigrants and
other racialized communities have been blamed for the spread of
disease. This is a story we have seen before: a crisis engulfs the world;
societies, already marked by racial inequalities, react by blaming
communities of color, immigrants, and other marginalized groups; and
governments respond to the social backlash with measures that only
make those inequalities worse. Our socio-legal responses to public
health crises in particular have historically facilitated discrimination
against racialized communities while relying on scientific technologies
to normalize the continued existence of racial inequality.
Public health responses to past epidemics (and pandemics) have
tended to exacerbate the distinctions between citizens and non-citizens
and White and non-White persons. Outbreaks of disease can trigger a
racialized "othering" process, whereby certain population groups
(namely immigrants and certain non-White racial groups) are wrongly
blamed for outbreaks of disease while resurrecting dangerous ideas of
1

See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., System Justification: A Motivational Process with

Implications for Social Conflict, in

JUSTICE AND CONFLICTS: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL

315, 321 (Elisabeth Kals & Jurgen Maes eds., 2012) (describing how
people respond to system threats and social conflict through psychological reactions
CONTRIBUTIONS

that rationalize the status quo and pre-existing social inequality).
2

OF

Id.; CTR.

FOR DISEASE CTR. & PREVENTION, CRISIS & EMERGENCY RISK COMM'N: PSYCHOLOGY

A CRISIS, at 3 (2019), https://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/ppt/CERC_Psychologyofa_

Crisis.pdf.
3 See Jost et al., supra note 1 at 321.
4

Id.
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racial biological difference. Our history is littered with racialized
responses to health crises: the Black Death pandemic (which led to the
persecution of Jewish communities),s the 1793 Yellow Fever epidemic
(which fostered discriminatory notions of racial differences in disease
susceptibility), 6 the 1918 "Spanish" Flu epidemic (where Black and
7
Indigenous communities were wrongly blamed for disease spread),
and the SARS epidemic (where Asian communities, in particular, were
8
faced with rampant discrimination).
Health crises are racially weaponized in that immigrant and nonWhite populations are seen as both potential disease threats to White
"Americans," as well as more biologically susceptible (or, in some cases,
more resistant) to the disease itself. The public health measures
enacted in reaction to this crisis-driven racialized fear of others-such
as quarantines, immigration restrictions, and the enforcement of health
mandates-are in turn disproportionately targeted in a manner that
exacerbates race-based disparities.
III. SURVEILLANCE DISCRIMINATION
Public health surveillance-such as contact tracing and
quarantines-has long been a proven and reliable method for
9
The disproportionate
combating epidemics and pandemics.
surveillance of racialized communities, however, has also long been a
method of social control, which can "reify boundaries, borders, and
10
bodies along racial lines" often leading to discriminatory treatment.
Any expansion of surveillance thus carries with it the risk of not only
the
individual privacy but also exacerbating
undermining
disproportionate surveillance of marginalized communities along race,
11
poverty, and immigration dimensions.

s Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., The Black Death and the Burning of Jews, 196 PAST & PRESENT
3, 3 (2007).
6 Rana Asali Hogarth, The Myth ofInnate Racial Differences Between White andBlack
People's Bodies: Lessons From the 1793 Yellow Fever Epidemic in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1339, 1339 (2019).
7 Piper Hudspeth Blackburn, How Racism Shaped the PublicHealth Response to the
1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic, NORTHWESTERN UNIV.: THE COVID-19 ANALYZER (May 3, 2020),
https://nationalsecurityzone.medill.northwestern.edu/covidanalyzer/news/how9
racism-colored-the-public-health-response-to-the-1 18-spanish-flu-pandemic.
8 Bobbie Person et al., Fear andStigma: The Epidemic Within the SARS Outbreak, 10
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 358, 358-59 (2004).
9 See generally FRANK M. SNOWDEN, EPIDEMICS AND SOCIETY: FROM THE BLACK DEATH TO THE
PRESENT (2019).
10 SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 16 (2015).

11 Id. (discussing the disparate impact of surveillance technologies and defining
racialized surveillance as "a technology of social control where surveillance practices,
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We have already witnessed racialized responses to the COVID-19
pandemic across the world. Discrimination and xenophobia against
Chinese and other Asian communities have mushroomed, in no small
measure fueled by former President Trump's characterization of the
disease as the "Chinese virus" and "kung-fu flu," with 60 percent of
Asian-Americans reporting being blamed by others for the pandemic
and a surge in anti-Asian hate crimes.1 2 Almost 40 percent of polled
Americans report that anti-Asian racism has become more common
since the start of the pandemic, while 30 percent report that anti-Black
racism has increased.13
The disproportionate surveillance of racialized communities has
similarly increased during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In America,
disturbing disparities in the COVID-19 surveillance of racial minorities
have emerged. In New York City, 92 percent of people arrested for
violating COVID-19 protocols (such as social-distancing requirements)
were either Black or Latinx, while over 80 percent of persons issued
summons were people of color. 14 Researchers found that the majority
of persons arrested for violating COVID-19 rules in Ohio were Black.15
A recent report found that people of color were two-and-a-half times
more likely to be surveilled and punished for COVID-19 violations than

policies, and performances concern the production of norms pertaining to race and
exercise a 'power to define what is in or out of place") (internal quotations omitted).
12 Qin Gao & Xiaofang Liu, Stand Against Anti-Asian Racial Discrimination
During
COVID-19: A Callfor Action, INT'L. Soc. WORK 1, 1-2 (2020).
13

Neil G. Ruiz, Juliana Menasce Horowitz & Christine Tamir, Many Black and Asian

Americans Say They Have ExperiencedDiscriminationAmid the COVID-19 Outbreak, PEW
RES. CTR. (July 1, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/07/01/many-blackand-asian-americans-say-they-have-experienced-discrimination-amid-the-covid-19outbreak.
14 Josiah Bates, Police Data Reveals Stark Racial Discrepanciesin Social Distancing
EnforcementAcrossNew York City, TIME, May 8, 2020, https://time.com/5834414/nypdsocial-distancing-arrest-data; Ashley Southall, N.Y.C. CommissionerDenies Racial Bias in
Social Distancing Policing, N.Y TIMES, May 13, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
05/13/nyregion/nypd-social-distancing-race-coronavirus.html (also finding that at
least 300 out of 374 summonses issued by the New York Police Department for violating
COVID-19 rules were to Black or Latinx people). The Legal Aid Society of New York has
similarly found racial disparities in COVID-19 related arrests and summonses. Racial
Disparitiesin NYPD's COVID-19 Policing: Unequal Enforcement of 311 Social Distancing
Calls, LEGAL AID SoCIETY 1, 3-4 (2020), https://legalaidnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/05/LASRacial-Disparities-in-NYPDs-COVID-19Policing_5.20.20_5PMFINAL.pdf.
15 Justin Jouvenal &Michael Brice-Saddler, Social DistancingEnforcement is Ramping
Up. So is Concern that Black and Latino Residents May Face Harsher Treatment, WASH.
PosT (May 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/socialdistancing-enforcement-is-ramping-up-so-is-concern-that-black-and-latino-residentsmay-face-harsher-treatment/2020/05/10/bbcf490-8fbd-1 lea-9e23-6914ee410
a5fstory.html.
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White persons, with Black persons being targeted by government
authorities for such violations at four-and-a-half times the rate of White
people.16
Such patterns of racialized surveillance in response to COVID-19
have also occurred globally. African migrants have not only been
subjected to widespread discrimination in China as a result of the
pandemic but have also been selectively targeted-based on race-by
7
In
government authorities for forcible testing and quarantining.'
for
community
Bulgaria, the government has targeted the ethnic Roma
increased surveillance, arrests, and quarantines in an effort "to protect
the general population" from the "threat" posed by the Roma and
8
persons of different ethnicities.1 More disturbingly, Bulgarian officials
declared that the Roma are a public health threat that needs to be
"controlled and contained," and used airplanes to spray chemicals to
19
In France, fines for
purportedly "disinfect" Roma neighborhoods.
enforced in areas
disproportionately
were
rules
violating COVID-19
times the rate
three
at
with majority North and West African residents
20
Throughout the world, governments have
of other communities.
similarly subjected refugees and asylum-seekers to targeted
quarantines, police abuse, and deprivation of basic human rights in
countries. 21 Pierrette Herzberger-Fofana, a former German Member of
the European Parliament, observed that research has demonstrated
that "racialised groups, black people, Roma people, people of north
African origin and migrants are much more likely to be targeted and
victims of police violence" in the enforcement of COVID-19 public health

16 PASCAL EMMER ET AL., UNMASKED: IMPACTS OF PANDEMIC POLICING, COVID19 POLICING

PROJECT 30 (2020), https://communityresourcehub.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
12/Unmasked.pdf.
17 See Human Rights Watch, China: COVID-19 DiscriminationAgainst Africans, HUM.
RIGHTS WATCH (May 5, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/05/china-covid19-discrimination-against-africans#.
18 AMNESTY INT'L, POLICING THE PANDEMIC: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF COVID-19 MEASURES IN EUROPE 5 (2020), https://www.amnesty.org/download/

Documents/EUR0125112020ENGLISH.PDF.
19 Id. at 10-11; see also Maria Cheng & Teodora Barzakova, Some European Officials
Use Virus as Cover to Target Roma, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct 15, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-pandemics-police-discrimination426
The Roma have been
e.
eastern-europe-2cbcdb5ee070578b73b1bc35ebdb
disproportionately policed in many other countries as well, with officials blaming Roma

persons for the spread of COVID-19 and subjecting them to harsh quarantines and police

abuses of force. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 18, at 4-5.
20 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 18, at 20.
21 Id. at 9-17. In a detailed report of global human rights abuses in the wake of

COVID-19, Amnesty International found that "enforcement of lockdown measures [has]
rapidly served as a pretext for the unlawful use of force" by law enforcement Id. at 21.
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measures. 22 Similarly, a report from the United Nations concluded that
"people of African descent are reportedly being disproportionately
controlled, harassed and profiled by law enforcement authorities, with
other people being treated differently or not subjected to control at
all." 23
The rise of discrimination against racialized persons, often
exacerbated by governmental policies, can ironically be traced in part to
the well-documented race-based disparities in COVID-19 contraction
and health outcomes. 24 Black, Latino, and Indigenous populations have
hospitalization rates that are 4.5 to 5.5 times higher than the White
population, and also have disproportionate death rates.25 These
disparities are compounded by the differential rates with which racial
populations are obtaining access to the COVID-19 vaccines. For
example, in Texas, Latinos make up only 15 percent of the population
that has been vaccinated, despite accounting for 44 percent of cases and
almost 50 percent of all deaths from the virus. 26 And in Mississippi,
Black persons have received 15 percent of vaccinations, despite
constituting 38 percent of cases and 42 percent of deaths. 27 Such racebased disparities, in turn, have fueled perceptions that non-White
persons are more biologically prone to contracting (and dying from)
COVID-19, leading to a resurgence of dangerous notions of racial

Daniel Boffey, Policing of European Covid-19 Lockdowns Shows Racial Bias-Report,
(June 24, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/24/
policing-of-european-covid-19-lockdowns-shows-racial-bias-report.
23 Racial Discriminationin the Context of the Covid-19 Crisis, ToPics IN Focus: RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION (U.N. Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm'r, Geneva Switz.) June 22, 2020, at 3
(noting that "racial discrimination is manifested in who is penalized for 'violating'
22

GUARDIAN

restrictions during the pandemic, with marginalised communities facing heightened
risks").

24 Ying Liu et al., PerceivedDiscrimination and Mental Distress Amid the COVID-19
Pandemic: Evidence from the UnderstandingAmerica Study, 59 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED.

481, 488-89 (2020) (tracing the rise in discrimination to media reporting of race-based
disparities in contracting COVID-19).
25 Daniel Wood, As PandemicDeathsAdd Up, Racial DisparitiesPersist-Andin Some

Cases Worsen, NPR (Sept. 23, 2020, 1:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/09/23/914427907/as-pandemic-deaths-add-up-racial-disparitiespersist-and-in-some-cases-worsen.
26 Ari Shapiro, Early Data Shows Striking Racial Disparities in Who's Getting the
COVID-19 Vaccine, NPR (Jan. 28, 2021, 6:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
coronavirus-live-updates/2021/01/28/961703505/early-data-shows-striking-racialdisparities-in-whos-getting-the-covid-19-vaccin.
27 Nambi Ndugga et al., Early State Vaccination Data Raise Warning Flagsfor Racial
Equity, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/earlystate-vaccination-data-raise-warning-flags-racial-equity.
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biological differences. 28 While the social determinants of health clearly
cause these disparities, there has long been an allure to thinking about
"races" as distinct biological entities in order to rationalize racial
inequality. 29 This rationalization is shocking, but not unexpected, as our
social and governmental responses to past pandemics have historically
advanced unfounded theories of race-based differences in disease
30
susceptibility to justify discriminatory public health measures.
Unfortunately, discrimination against vulnerable populations can in
31
turn impede the public health response to the pandemic.
of racialized
disproportionate surveillance
The racially
to
technologies
new
of
use
the
by
exacerbated
been
has
communities
and
Apple
the
as
(such
apps
Proximity
trace and monitor COVID-19.
Google COVID-19 apps) have been promoted as a way to allow for digital
contact tracing and exposure notifications, and are typically installed on
32
cell phones and wearable technology. Location data from cell phones
("cell site location information") has also been collected around the
world to enforce quarantine requirements and engage in contact
tracing. 33 Genetic samples collected from enhanced COVID-19 testing
protocols have also been a key tool in reducing the transmission of
COVID-19. 34 Similarly, traditional forms of police surveillance-such as

28 Ying Liu et al., Perceived Discrimination and Mental Distress Amid the COVID-19

Pandemic: Evidence From the UnderstandingAmerica Study, SCIENCEDAILY (July 7, 2020)

(tracing the rise in discrimination to media reporting of race-based disparities in

contracting COVID-19).
29 See Christian B. Sundquist, The Technologies ofRace: Big Data, Privacyand the New
Racial Bioethics, 27 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205, 208 (2018).
30 See, e.g., FRANK M. SNOWDEN, EPIDEMICS AND SOCIETY: FROM THE BLACK DEATH TO THE
PRESENT 62-68 (2019); Necia B. Hobbes, Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire:Heightened

Discrimination& Reduced Legal Safeguards When PandemicStrikes, 72 U. PITT. L. REv. 779
(2011); Vanessa Northington Gamble, "There Wasn't a Lot of Comforts in Those Days:"
African Americans, Public Health, and the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, 125(3) Pus. HEALTH
REPS. 114, 114-21 (2010).
31 Hogarth, supra note 6.
32 See Jennifer D. Oliva, Surveillance, Privacy, and App Tracking, in ASSESSING LEGAL
RESPONSES TO COVID-19 40, 41 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 2020), https://www.public
healthlawwatch.org/s/Chp_COVIDPolicyPlaybook-Aug2020-htfr.pdf.
33 Id.
34 NAT'L INST. ON AGING, Why COVID-19 Testing is the Key to Getting Back to Normal
(Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.nia.nih.gov/news/why-covid-19-testing-key-gettingback-normal.
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facial recognition software, 35 drones, 36 GPS ankle monitors, 37 thermal
imaging, 38 and geofencing 39-have been used around the world to
monitor public movement and enforce COVID-19 restrictions.
The potential for racial discrimination in the enforcement of
COVID-19 rules, as well as in the collection of COVID-19 data, is
heightened by the delegation of public health surveillance duties to local
law enforcement agencies. Given the long history of the racialization of
policing,40 allowing individual police officers (rather than public health
officials) to enforce pandemic regulations has led to significant racially
disproportionate intrusions on privacy and, in some cases, freedom. 4 1
State policies to share private health information collected by
laboratories (testing for COVID-19 positive cases) and hospitals
(engaging in both testing and treatment of COVID-19 patients) with law
enforcement agencies have magnified such intrusions. 42 A recent study
appearing in the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry thus concluded that, as
"vulnerable subpopulations pay a higher price for surveillance
measures," "[t]here is reason to worry that some types of COVID-19
technology might lead to the employment of disproportionate profiling,
policing, and criminalization of marginalized groups." 43

35 Antoaneta Roussi, Resisting the Rise of FacialRecognition, NATURE (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03188-2.
36 Birgit Schippers, Coronavirus:Drones Used to Enforce Lockdown Pose a Real Threat
to Our Civil Liberties, CONVERSATION (May 26, 2020), https://theconversation.com/
coronavirus-drones-used-to-enforce-lockdown-pose-a-real-threat-to-our-civil-

liberties-138058.
37 Lauren Kilgor, Covid-19 has Led to a Worrisome Uptick in the Use of Electronic
Ankle Monitors, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

(Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.technology

review.com/2020/10/08/1009822/covid-19-surveillance-electronic-ankle-monitorsopinion.
38 David Vergun, Department Uses Thermal Imaging to Detect COVID-1 9, U.S. DEP'T OF
DEF. (May 6, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2178
32 0/department-uses-thermal-imaging-to-detect-covid-19.

39

See Yasheng Huang, Meicen Sun & Yuze Sui, How Digital Contact Tracing Slowed

Covid-19 in East Asia, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/howdigital-contact-tracing-slowed-covid-19-in-east-asia.
40 See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Abolition Constitutionalism,133 HARV. L. REV. 1,
19-29 (2019).
41 See supra pp. 1537-40.
42 See EMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 28 (noting, for example, that the Governor of
Arizona issued an executive order for an "enhanced surveillance advisory" allowing law
enforcement agencies to access private medical data).
43 Tereza Hendl et al., Pandemic Surveillance and Racialized Subpopulations:
Mitigating Vulnerabilities in COVID-19 Apps, 17 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 829, 829 (Aug. 25,
2020); Abby Dennis, How Google's Surveillance Technology Endangers Communities of
Color, MEDIUM (May 20, 2020), https://medium.com/breaking-down-the-system/howgoogles-surveillance-technology-endangers-communities-of-color-c532d5f1f1ac;
David Uberti, Police Requests for Google Users' Location Histories Face New Scrutiny,
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A related concern that technology has disproportionately impacted
the privacy risks of marginalized communities lies in the fact that most
of the surveillance technologies that have been deployed in the fight
against COVID-19 were developed and overseen by private market
actors (such as Google, Apple, and Palantir), as opposed to government
health authorities (where a clear interest of such private actors is to
monetize consumer health data). This concern is not mere speculation.
Google's "Project Nightingale"-which was revealed just months before
the COVID-19 pandemic was recognized in March of 2020-collects
personal medical data from over fifty million Americans (such as birth
records, medical diagnoses, lab results, and so forth) through an
association with Ascension-the country's largest nonprofit health
system. 44 The Project contains very few legal safeguards relating to how
45
such data may be used and when such data must be de-anonymized.
Google has also been selling personal information and location data
to law enforcement and other government actors through its
Sensorvault database. 46 Law enforcement uses this data, which involves
records of hundreds of millions of devices around the world, to identify
47
With Sensorvault, data is
suspects who were located near crimes.
narrows the field of
enforcement
law
once
Yet,
anonymized.
initially
grant) that the data
usually
will
suspects, they can request (and Google
be re-identifiedwith personal information (like names, addresses, race,
any app subscriptions one has, browsing history, and so forth) to locate
suspects. 48 This capability has led Google to transfer thousands of
individuals' data to law enforcement, even though most or all of the
persons unwittingly surveilled typically have no connection to the crime
The collection of COVID-19 health and surveillance information
through private actors and law enforcement can lead to the
disproportionate targeting of racialized groups and a resurgence of
discredited biological conceptions of race. While there may well be a
July 27, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/police-requests-for-googleusers-location-histories-face-new-scrutiny-11595842201.
44 Mary Beth Griggs, Google Reveals 'Project Nightingale' After Being Accused of
Secretly Gathering Personal Health Records, VERGE (Nov. 11, 2019, 11:40 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/11/20959771/google-health-records-projectnightingale-privacy-ascension.
4s Id.
46 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google is a Dragnetfor the Police,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/13/us/
WALL ST. J.,

google-location-tracking-police.html.

47 Id.
48 Id.
49

Id.
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public health benefit in collecting such race-based data (as a tool to
understand and combat race-based health disparities), 50 there are also
privacy dangers that such information will be de-anonymized, used to
justify enhanced policing of racialized communities, and increase social
blaming of racial minorities and immigrants. As a recent article in The
Lancet warns, such demographic data is "not necessarily related to a
person's health and might lead to stigmatization of particular ethnic or
socioeconomic groups" and "to a surge in discrimination" against racial
minorities. 51
So, can our current privacy laws protect against the
disproportionate surveillance of racial populations? Unfortunately, the
answer is a resounding "no." The United States' sectoral approach to
privacy protection is simply inadequate to respond to the very real (and
often racialized) threats to privacy posed by the often-unregulated
expansion of private surveillance technology. From a federal privacy
law perspective, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) creates certain protections for "Individually Identifiable Health
Information" by means of its Privacy Rule and Security Rule.5 2 HIPAA is
inadequate to respond to the current privacy challenges created by the
pandemic, however, because it does not have a private right of action;
applies only to a very narrow range of health data and health
institutions (such as covered entities and their "business associates");
and creates a number of "public purpose" exceptions (which could be
used to transfer data to law enforcement agencies).5 3 The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act is similarly insufficient to protect
private health information collected during the pandemic, as it is
extremely limited in scope and only regulates health insurance plans
and employers with respect to discrimination against employees based
on genetic information. 54 The 21st Century Cures Act provides federal
health research subjects with certain rights regarding how their genetic
data can be disclosed, and yet it is quite narrow in terms of its
50 Joia Crear-Perry & Michael McAfee, To Protect Black Americans from the Worst
Impacts of COVID-19, Release Comprehensive Racial Data, Sci. AM. (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/to-protect-black-americans-from-theworst-impacts-of-covid-19-release-comprehensive-racial-data.
s1 Urs Gasser et al., Digital Tools Against COVID-19: Taxonomy, Ethical Challenges,
and Navigation Aid, 2 LANCET 425, 428 (2020) (noting that "stratifying populations on
these grounds might reinforce existing divides that leave particular groups more
vulnerable to the pandemic").
S2 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
s3 Id.
s4 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (2008).
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application and exceptions allowing disclosure that can undermine
privacy rights.ss In a similar vein, various Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) regulations, such as the Health and Data Breach Notification
Rules, allow the FTC to hold private companies liable for certain privacy
violations or consumer misrepresentations. And yet, these regulations
are also limited by their terms in responding to the full panoply of
56
Our hodgepodge of state privacy
privacy issues raised by COVID-19.
laws is similarly inadequate to respond to a crisis of national (and
international) proportions.
An appeal to federal constitutional privacy rights also would not
serve as a sufficient legal framework for protecting privacy. The United
States Supreme Court decisions in Whalen v. Roe, Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, United States v.Jones, and Carpenter v. United States provided
some limited, yet important, privacy rights. For example, Whalen
recognized a Fourteenth Amendment privacy right to ones' health data
57
against disclosure by a state actor; Ferguson recognized a limited
58
Fourth Amendment privacy right in health data; Jones recognized a
59
Fourth Amendment privacy right to GPS location data; and Carpenter
recognized a Fourth Amendment right to ones' cell site location
information. 60 But these rights are very limited when applied to the
current context, as they do not apply to the actions of private actors
(including employers) but instead relate to surveillance by government
actors. 61
IV. CONCLUSION

The "enduring tension"62 between public health surveillance and
privacy creates a dilemma for our COVID-19 response. How can we
balance the need for public health surveillance measures with the
strong likelihood that such measures may be applied in a racially
55 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).

16 C.F.R. §§ 318.1-318.8 (2009).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012).
60 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct 2206, 2269 (2018).
61 Notably, even those Fourth Amendment rights tied to government action are
limited by a number of judicially recognized exceptions, such as the Special Needs
doctrine (which one can see as being successfully raised to allow for expanded
surveillance by law enforcement actors). See Orin S. Kerr, The Questionable Objectivity
of Fourth Amendment Law, 99 TEX. L. REV. 447, 456-61 (2021).
62 Amy Fairchild, Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Privacy and Public Health
Surveillance: The Enduring Tension, AM. MED. ASS'N J. ETHICS (Dec. 2007),
https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/privacy-and-public-health-surveillance56
s7
s8
s9

enduring-tension/2007-12.

1546

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1535

discriminatory manner? How can we protect the privacy rights of
racialized communities while remaining committed to critical public
health measures such as contact tracing, quarantines, and expanded
COVID-19 testing?
We might begin by recognizing that both privacy and nondiscriminatory public health surveillance can co-exist. Protecting
individual privacy rights is often essential to protect the public health
from disease threats in that, without such rights, people may refuse to
share information with the government that could assist with its
pandemic response and contact tracing. We can see this in racialized
communities' heightened mistrust of COVID-19 public health measures
(such as vaccines), given our history of racially disproportionate health
and law enforcement surveillance. 63 But we must also recognize that
our current sectoral approach to privacy is ill-suited to protecting
privacy rights and guarding against discrimination in a pandemic: we
have a mish-mash of privacy laws and regulations ranging from
consumer protection, to education privacy, to medical privacy, and
everything in between. Our HIPAA and Genetic Privacy laws, as
discussed earlier, are woefully inadequate to respond to the privacy
concerns raised by modern technology. A national omnibus approach
to privacy could fill some of these gaps, for example, by ensuring that
health data information is protected even when collected by an actor
that is not a HIPAA entity or "business associate," as well as by creating
meaningful biometric information privacy laws. Two recent legislative
proposals are promising, and yet limited in their scope. The COVID-19
Consumer Data Protection Act, sponsored by Senator Roger Wicker and
others, is much too limited to respond to the racial privacy issues
implicated by the pandemic-creating broad exceptions for employerbased surveillance and including no enforceable private right of
action. 64 The Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, sponsored by
Senators Richard Blumenthal and Mark Warner, is more promising in
that it requires opt-in consent, data minimization, limits on disclosure
to government actors, restrictions on the commercialization of health
data, nondiscrimination provisions, and a private right of action. 65 And
yet it contains very broad exceptions for contact tracing and information
maintained by HIPAA entities. 66

Simar Singh Bajaj & Fatima Cody Stanford, Beyond Tuskegee-Vaccine Distrustand
Everyday Racism, 12 NEw ENG. J. MED. 384 (2021).
64 COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020).
65 Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. (2020).
63

66

id.
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A federal omnibus approach to privacy must coalesce around clear
privacy norms and values while being guided by racial justice principles
67
A race-conscious
that normalize access to vaccines and health care.
approach to COVID-19 privacy would share many common features:
opt-in consent; anonymization of data to prevent re-identification;
private rights of action to ensure the enforceability of privacy violations;
norms of proportionality, transparency, and data minimization; strict
limitations on how such data may be used (including provisions that
prevent the sharing of health surveillance data with law enforcement
and immigration authorities, and restrictions on the commercialization
of private data); and the creation of a robust nondiscrimination policy
(such that health data could not be used to deny health insurance,
employment, education, and other social benefits). But this approach
will be limited in its protection against racialized surveillance unless
COVID-19 enforcement powers are removed from law enforcement
68
With
agencies and placed in the hands of public health authorities.
to
prevent
laws
new
creating
begin
can
we
principles,
these guiding
health surveillance from becoming a system of entrenched racialized
surveillance and exploitation.

67 carrie Hanlon & Elinor Higgins, States Use Race and Ethnicity Data to Identify
Disparitiesand Inform Their COVID-19 Responses, NAT'L ACAD. FOR ST. HEALTH POL'Y (Apr.
13, 2020), https://nashp-staging.rcvmnfm3-liquidwebsites.com/states-use-race-andethnicity-data-to-identify-disparities-and-inform-their-covid-19-responses.
68

EMMER ET AL., Supra note 16, at 70-71.

